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1. Introduction 
According to the sensorimotor approach to perception and perceptual awareness, 
perceptual experience should be seen fundamentally as a way of interacting with the 
environment (O’Regan and Noë 2001), O’Regan 2011).  What distinguishes 
perceptual experiences is the different ways in which a perceiver perceptually engages 
with the environment.  What sets apart hearing from seeing, for example, are the 
differences between the patterns of auditory versus visual engaging with the world. 
Similarly, within a single (sub-) modality such as color vision, what sets apart an 
experience of red from an experience of green are also the differences in the modes of 
interaction with the environment that are involved.  It has been argued by 
sensorimotor theorists that this relocation of emphasis from the brain to the 
interaction with the environment, or “going wide” (the phrase is from Hutto & Myin 
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2013, Chapter 8), offers a fruitful perspective on stubborn problems regarding 
understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness.  
After having reviewed the sensorimotor approach to perceptual experience, and what 
underlies its claims on allowing to understand perceptual consciousness, we will 
investigate a similar shift of emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) to an 
interactive approach in the study of psychopathology.  Indeed, such a shift is 
implemented in approaches to psychopathology which focus on the role of person-
environment interactions in the study of the positive and negative phenomena of 
psychosis, by means of ambulatory monitoring (see (Myin-Germeys et al. 2009) 
below).  Underlying such approaches is a view of psychopathology as involving 
altered ways of interacting with one’s local context. In this paper, we will focus on the 
similarities between the sensorimotor view of perception and the interactive view to 
psychopathology. We will explore potential synergies and discuss the gains that could 
be obtained by turning one’s view outward.   
 
2. “Going wide” for perceptual awareness: the sensorimotor approach  
2.1. The narrow take on consciousness 
“What is consciousness?” remains to many a baffling question, especially if one 
considers the qualitative or phenomenal aspects consciousness. The experience of 
seeing a purple rose, the sensations of holding an ice cube or tasting vanilla seem, in 
all their subjective, phenomenal glory not easy to reconcile in a world made up of 
photons, quarks, waves and energy.  
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It is natural to frame questions about the scientific understanding of consciousness in 
terms of the potential of neuroscience to elucidate awareness, including its qualitative 
complexities and depths. The burden regarding consciousness then lies on 
neuroscience: it is the study of the brain which should bring the required scientific 
understanding of consciousness. It should, which means it also could fail. Theorists 
who focus on neuroscience as the place where the battle for consciousness should be 
decided are divided between optimists and pessimists. Optimists reckon that more 
closely studying the brain will unlock the secrets of consciousness. For example, in 
his book “The Quest for Consciousness: A Neurobiological Approach”, Christof 
Koch admits to be guided by  “a hunch that the NCC [Neural Correlates for 
Consciousness] involve specific biological mechanisms. “ (Koch 2004, 101). He 
looks for “particular mechanisms that confer onto coalitions of neurons properties that 
correspond to attributes of conscious percepts.” (Koch 2004, 103). Koch thinks the 
very nature of the branch of biology he pursues motivates his approach to 
consciousness:  
“The specificity that is a hallmark of molecular and cellular biology suggests that 
the correlates of consciousness are based on equally particular biological 
mechanisms and gadgets, involving identifiable types of neurons, interconnected in 
some special way and firing in some pertinent manner.”   
(Koch 2004,105) 
Pessimists about the prospects of neuroscience, on the other hand, see the existence of 
consciousness as an indication of the limits of neuroscience and by implication of 
science in general. This position has been defended, famously, by Colin McGinn who 
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despairs of the possibility to intelligibly elucidating how “the water of biological 
tissue” turns  “into the wine of consciousness.” (McGinn 1989, 348) 
Despite coming to radically differing conclusions, the common platform for both 
optimists and pessimists is the initial assumption that one should turn to 
neuroscientific or brain-based properties if one wants to understand how 
consciousness in a physical world is possible. What splits them apart is a different 
assessment of whether this expectation will be met.  
Enter the sensorimotor approach to perception and perceptual awareness. Crucially, it 
disagrees with both optimists and pessimists regarding their commonly held tenet that 
the secret to understanding consciousness lies in the brain. Sensorimotor theorists do 
agree with pessimists in holding that one does not have to expect that the links that 
will be found between brain processes and experiences will be enlightening or 
illuminating when it comes to understanding the phenomenal feel of experience. 
Unlike the pessimists, however, sensorimotor theorists do not see this lack of 
intelligible relation between brain processes and phenomenal consciousness as 
showing that neuroscience, or science in general, fails to reach a goal it could be 
reasonably expected to attain. The problem lies not with (neuro-)science, but with the 
expectation that the “laws” of phenomenal consciousness should be found in the brain.  
For what would it mean that the “laws of phenomenal consciousness” (O’Regan and 
Block 2012) would be found in the brain? It would mean that some intracranial 
process could be intelligibly related to phenomenal feel. It would mean that through 
such neural-phenomenal laws, it could be shown how qualitative consciousness was 
‘generated by the physical processes in the brain’ On the left hand side of such laws, 
one would find a neural process, on the right hand side a phenomenal feel, and the 
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laws themselves would make their correspondence intelligible. The example that has 
become iconic for the identity theory of the fifties and sixties, the philosophy which 
proposed that mental states are brain states, can still serve: C-fibers on the neural side 
and pain on the other side (Smart 1958). This example was scientifically simplistic 
both regarding the complexity and variety of neural processes underlying pain, as well 
as concerning the complexity of pain awareness (see Grahek 2007 for a philosophical 
discussion of some of these issues). However, what has been philosophically 
revealing about the example holds regardless of any complications of the left hand or 
right hand side of such a law. For it seems that, whatever brain process one substitutes 
on the left hand side and whatever feel on the right hand side, the relation between 
them remains brute and in itself unexplained, or unintelligible. Observation of this 
bruteness can drive theorists who set out from strong expectations regarding the brain 
in the two different directions corresponding to our optimist/pessimist division. Some 
might hope that despite first appearances, there might be deeper neural laws to be 
uncovered so that the left hand side will one day be filled in with a worthy candidate 
able to be revealingly related to feel and thus to its right hand counterpart. Yet it is 
hard to see how anything on the neural side might fulfill such a role. Whatever will be 
found, it will be some objective process, itself apparently lacking any of the 
subjective, qualitative feels present on the right hand side – the feel of red, sweetness, 
or pain… It is precisely the fact that there is a general issue about relating objective 
brain processes to phenomenal feels that drives pessimists to declare consciousness to 
lie beyond the limits of neuroscience – and when coupled with the expectation that 
neuroscience is the relevant science for elucidating consciousness, this conclusion 
transforms into a pessimist assessment of the potential of science itself regarding 
consciousness.  
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2.2. Why and how the sensorimotor approach goes wide 
From the sensorimotor approach comes a different proposal: instead of aiming to find 
intelligible physico-phenomenal laws inside the confines of the cranium, one looks 
elsewhere. In particular, if one wants to find an intelligible relation between the 
phenomenal and the physical one must look at the interactions between an organism 
and its environment. In other words the sensorimotor approach proposes to “go wide” 
when looking for the laws of qualitative consciousness instead of “narrowly” peeking 
inside the brain.  
Tactile examples have served the sensorimotor approach well to illustrate the strategy 
of going wide. Consider the qualitative experience one has when pressing something 
hard, like a piece of marble. A narrow strategy would expect to find the secret of the 
particular quality of hardness by considering the brain processes involved in the 
experience. As pessimists will be keen to point out, it looks like no properties likely to 
be encountered in the brain – be they neural firings, neural connections, electricity, 
chemistry or quantum mechanics—will ever connect intelligibly with hardness. But 
prospects change, so the sensorimotor approach insists, when one turns to the pattern 
of interaction which a perceiving agent will enact when it experiences something as 
hard. Typically, the agent will push or press, and encounter resistance. Even under 
more forceful pushing, the hard object will not yield. In general, so the sensorimotor 
account proposes, perceptual experiences are constituted by interactions characterized 
by precise patterns of ways in which worldly stimulation changes with specific 
actions on the part of the perceiver, so-called patterns of sensorimotor contingency 
(O’Regan & Noë 2001, O’Regan 2011). Having a certain perceptual experience with 
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a certain phenomenal quality corresponds to embodying or enacting an interaction 
characterized by a specific pattern of sensorimotor contingencies. According to the 
sensorimotor approach this account for perceptual feel works across the board. It 
doesn’t apply accidently only to touch, but to all of the sensory modalities. Seeing and 
having the phenomenal experience of a color too consists, according to the 
sensorimotor approach, in embodying a pattern of interaction typical for a certain 
color. This color pattern consists of such facts as that moving in such and such a way 
with respect to a surface will change the light reaching the eye in such and such a way. 
Though the example of color undoubtedly has less intuitive appeal than a tactile 
example, pursuing this sensorimotor approach in the context of color has led to 
striking empirical results. For example, it has been shown to be possible to account 
for the special role that the “focal colors” red, yellow, green and blue play in 
perception, in terms of the finding that surfaces of these colors have the particularity 
that they alter incoming light in a simpler way than other surfaces (Philipona & 
O’Regan  2006, p. 336), and thus allowing different interactions, rather than, as is 
usually done, in terms of the structuring of experience by the peculiarities of 
neurophysiological processes, in particular the opponent channels (Degenaar & Myin 
2014, p. 395).  
The sensorimotor approach not only casts light on the specific feel of experiences 
within a modality, such as the phenomenal experience of hard or red, but also on the 
phenomenal quality of the different sensory modalities. Having a visual experience, as 
opposed to having, for example, an auditory experience, should, according to the 
sensorimotor approach, also be understood by “wide laws” of interaction. In a visual 
experience, moving or closing the eyes will have certain effects on how one’s visual 
system is stimulated, whereas it will have no such systematic effects on input from the 
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ears. A sensorimotor account has also been offered of the specific perceptual quality 
of experience. Perceptual experiences are different from thoughts because only the 
perceptual organism-environment interactions have features like “bodiliness” and 
“grabbiness” (O’Regan, Myin & Noë 2005; O’Regan 2011). “Bodiliness” concerns 
the fact, characteristic of perceptual interactions, that movements of the perceiver will 
have systematic changes on the incoming stimulation. “Grabbiness” refers to 
complementary typical aspect of a situation of perceptual interaction: that certain 
changes in the perceptual environment –such as a sudden flash of light or a loud 
sound will tend to attract perceptual attention and/or cause bodily reorientation. It is 
because of bodiliness and grabbiness that a perceiver is “immersed” in a perceptual 
situation. Conscious thinking about something has neither bodiliness nor grabbiness. 
Even if what you are thinking about would suddenly cease to exist, in most cases, this 
would have no immediate effects on your thoughts about it. These differences in the 
laws governing interaction with the environment, so the sensorimotor theory defends, 
hold the key to the phenomenal difference between thinking and perceiving.   
The sensorimotor approach has often been taken to reserve a primordial role for 
action in perception. No doubt, such understanding has been promoted by the 
rhetorics which helped the approach to secure a prominent place in recent discussion, 
as in the phrase that “visual consciousness” “is something we do”  (O’Regan & Noë 
2001, 970), rather than “something that happens to us, or in us” (Noë 2004, 1). It 
needs to be kept in mind, however, that the primary aim of the sensorimotor approach 
is to tie perception and perceptual awareness to an organism’s interaction with its 
environment. Interaction with an environment involves both affecting the 
environment and being affected by it — as is clear from the discussion of the concepts 
of bodiliness and grabbiness above. So, even if some formulations might suggest 
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otherwise, the sensorimotor account does have room to accommodate those aspects of 
experience which have primarily to do with how an organism is acted upon, or 
affected by the environment (Hutto 2005).  
Why is “going wide” a better strategy for attempting to understand consciousness 
than looking for narrow neural-phenomenal laws? A first consideration is that “going 
wide” connects with how we already understand awareness in our everyday speaking 
and writing, in literature, but also in science. Take the famous way of speaking about 
phenomenal consciousness as the “what it is like” aspect of experience (Nagel 1978). 
If we ask “what it is like “ to enter an airplane, to feel something hard, or see a bright 
red, the answers refers to the situations in which we have those or similar experiences. 
We might say that “what it is like to enter an airplane” is like entering a tunnel, that 
“feeling something hard” is like pushing something that resists, or that “seeing bright 
red” is like seeing an over-illuminated surface of glossy red plastic. Even experiences 
which don’t involve much actual interaction, like dreams or near death experiences, 
are described in terms of doing things in, and being affected by, an environment.  
In other words, when we talk about our experiences in non-theoretical or non-
philosophical contexts, we do so by invoking the kinds of interactions the experiences 
normally arise in. ‘Going wide’ and referring to interactions is the natural way to talk 
and therefore think about experience. The narrow approach, on the other hand, at least 
allows —and arguably even dictates — that the wide laws are only contingently 
related to the phenomenal feels. That is, on the narrow view, there is no fundamental 
connection to the interactions a certain feel is associated with and the “what it is like” 
of the feel. From the point of view of our pre-theoretic understanding of 
phenomenology, this narrow focus, or disregard of the wide interactions, is puzzling. 
It directs us away from the circumstances under which experiences normally happen, 
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towards “pure” experiences, unrelated to the worldly engagements such experiences 
normally form part of.  
Of course, congruence with pre-theoretical understanding shouldn’t carry too much 
weight in arguing for a theoretical sta nce towards anything, including experience. A 
second basis for support for the sensorimotor approach lies in scientific advantages. In 
particular, sensorimotor theorists claim their approach provides new insights and 
initiates new experimental paradigms in fields such as vision with distorting goggles, 
sensory substitution, neural plasticity and change blindness (O’Regan & Noë 2001, 
Hurley & Noë 2003, O’Regan 2011). The pattern which sensorimotor theorists 
discern in this research is that what one perceptually experiences is determined by 
how one interacts with the world, rather than by how sensory input is oriented, where 
it is received on the body, and which are the brain areas most involved in enabling the 
experience.  
A third set of considerations for going wide is philosophical. They can be introduced 
by stating a standard countermove to the thesis that the laws of phenomenology are 
wide (Block & O’Regan 2012)). A common reaction met by the sensorimotor 
approach is that it cannot be a correct approach to consciousness because the laws of 
phenomenology must be narrowly brain-bound because of the (alleged) fact that one 
can have perceptual awareness without involvement of the wide laws. In dreams, 
paralysis, or stimulation of the brain under experimental or medical conditions, 
experience can supervene on the brain and on the brain only, irrespective or 
independent of any interactive situations or surroundings. In a further step one can 
then reason that, if the phenomenology can supervene on nothing more than the brain 
in non-interactive situations, then one can conclude that also in interactive situations it 
supervenes on the brain only. Finally, one can conclude from such “narrow 
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supervenience” that the laws of phenomenology are narrow too (see Ned Block’s 
parts in O’Regan & Block, 2012, for a clear formulation of this way of reasoning) 
From an interactive perspective, this standard line of reasoning is not as solid as it 
might prima facie look. In the first place, one can question the assumptions made 
about supervenience of experience on the brain only. Philosophers often assume that a 
mere mention of the existence of dreams, hallucinations, or even the possibility 
thereof, or thought experiments about brains-in-vats establish brain-bound 
supervenience for experience in general. Philosophers of a different persuasion have 
recently raised serious challenges about these standard moves regarding 
supervenience. Cosmelli and Thompson (2010) have argued in great detail that 
everything we know about biology implies that the brain needs a body and some form 
of interaction with the environment in order for it to maintain a stable and continuous 
form of experience. Ken Pepper (2014) has raised the issue whether one can validly 
draw inferences about what experience “really is” by setting out from experience 
under abnormal conditions (as in dreams), rather than from experiences under 
standard conditions.  
Even if one leaves aside such worries about the starting assumptions of the standard 
reasoning, additional problems can be raised about the inference from narrow 
supervenience to narrow laws of phenomenology or narrow physico-phenomenal laws. 
These problems concern the very idea of a narrow law of phenomenology. In order to 
be genuinely narrow, such a law would have to make reference only to narrow, and 
thus non-interactive properties. On the “physico”, or brain side of the law, one can 
easily envisage how this could be done. It could be done, among other possibilities, 
by referring to the kinds of neural properties mentioned in the above quotes by 
Christof Koch.  In order to keep the “phenomeno”-side properly narrow, it would 
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have to contain a description of experience, in which experience is characterized in a 
way which did not contain any reference to interactive situations in which the 
experiences often or even only occasionally figure. The description serving in the 
experiential part of the law would require that a pure and self-contained “atom” of 
sensation could be distilled and described (Cooke and Myin 2011).   
Such genuinely narrow experiences would by their very (narrow) nature only be 
contingently or nonessentially connected to, or associated with, behaviors, actions, 
and interactions. If the bonds between experiences and interactions became tighter, 
the experiences would stop being genuinely narrow. That is, narrow experiences 
might have typical causal links to (inter-)actions, but those links would not affect the 
phenomenal character of the experience. In principle, a particular narrow experience 
might have causal links to (inter-)actions entirely different from those it is normally 
causally linked to, without any change in phenomenal feel. For example, one would 
have to hold that it was at least conceptually coherent, and possibly empirically 
possible, to “swap” phenomenal feels inter- and intramodally. Where person A would 
have normal colour experiences when being visually confronted with a coloured 
world, person B would under the same circumstances have no colour but olfactory 
experiences. Some philosophers embrace these consequences and think that only a 
concept of phenomenal feel that leads to these consequences will be satisfactory. 
Opposed to this, theorists of sensorimotor persuasion will point out that these 
consequences are unpalatable and in fact show the untenability of the concept of 
phenomenal experience that lies at their basis (see Dennett 1988, Cooke and Myin 
(2011) and  Myin, Cooke and Zahidi (in press), for arguments to this effect, supported 
by thought experiments).  
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A fourth and final consideration in favour of wide laws is practical: whatever the 
philosophical niceties, in fact, even if it were be granted that some narrow conception 
of phenomenality might be tenable, it remains the case that in any practical context, 
we go wide or operate on a wide conception of phenomenality. That is, when we want 
to intervene on phenomenal feels, in the large majority of cases, we intervene on 
interactions. If we want someone to experience the taste of a delicate dish, we feed 
them that dish instead of directly intervening on the brain. In other words, if there was 
a case to be made for metaphysically narrow laws, it would still not matter for any 
other purpose than metaphysics (on a certain –not unchallengeable conception of 
metaphysics). We would still continue in any practical context to deal with 
consciousness in our usual wide ways.  
 
3. “Going wide” to understand psychopathology 
3.1. The primacy of interaction, once more 
In the previous sections, we have given reasons for skepticism about the prospects of 
a strictly narrow account of the feel of perceptual experience. The core consideration 
we relied on concerned the nature of experience. Experience, so we defended, 
fundamentally concerns interactions: how a subject (or organism) interactively affects 
its environment, and is affected by its environment. As a consequence, an 
understanding of experience always involves relating experience to the interactional 
context, which it normally arises in – even when one considers experiences that occur 
outside of their standard interactive context. None of this leads to deny the role brain 
factors play in experience, but it does imply that brain factors will not provide a 
“deeper” understanding of experience – a kind of understanding that is more profound 
	 14	
than the one that is offered by considering experiences in their normal interactive 
contexts. The outlook is that we will make sense of the contribution of brain factors to 
experience by seeing the way the brain enables interactions rather than by 
understanding interactions in terms of brain factors. To return to the  “phenomenal 
redness of red”: this will not be more deeply comprehended by seeing how it derives 
directly from a brain mechanism. Rather, brain mechanisms involved in the 
experience of red are understood as such because of their direct, or derived, role in the 
kinds of interactions typical for “red”.  
Does it make sense to adopt a wide approach in the study of psychopathology too? 
Much of the research in the last 20 years aiming at a better understanding of 
psychopathology has had a narrow orientation. Just like the brain has seemed the 
obvious place to turn to when one want to answer questions about the phenomenal 
feel of consciousness, so the brain has seemed to many the obvious place to turn to 
when one wants to make sense of psychopathology. Thus, most research of 
psychopathology in the last two decades has been devoted to a closer investigation of 
the brain. But is this narrow focus more appropriate when it comes to studying 
psychopathology than when it comes to understanding the phenomenal feel of 
consciousness?  
A way in which this narrow orientation often finds expression in the characterization 
of psychopathology as a “brain disorder”, or “brain disease”. Thomas Insel states in a 
TEDx presentation at the California Institute of Technology that the problem is that 
we call these “brain disorders” mental or behavioral disorders (T. Insel 2013).  The 
idea of psychopathology as a “disease”, or the “ disease model” (Borsboom & Cramer 
2013) is predicated on a difference between a disease-specific set of symptoms and an 
underlying cause from which those symptoms flow forth. This underlying cause is 
	 15	
necessarily independent of the symptoms, and ideally, but not necessarily unitary: it 
then is a robust phenomenon, which can be characterized and manipulated on its own, 
irrespective of the symptoms, which can show variety.  
The disease model seems to be appropriate in some cases of somatic pathology, when 
a single underlying factor, such as the presence of a virus, can lie at the basis of a 
multitude of specific and related symptoms. One can treat the disease by going after 
the virus: once that has been removed, the symptoms will subside, whereas interfering 
with (some of the) symptoms, will not necessarily affect the virus (Borsboom & 
Cramer 2013).  
But it remains an open question whether the disease model applies to 
psychopathology. In order to tackle this question, it pays off to start by having a 
closer look at the actual phenomena of interest. Most research on psychopathology 
has been devoted to understanding the neural underpinnings of psychiatric conditions 
such as major depression, bipolar disorder or schizophrenia. However, the validity of 
these diagnostic categories has been questioned (van Os 2009, 2010), given that there 
is no symptomatic specificity - e.g. depression is common in Major Depressive 
Disorder, Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia -, no etiological specificity – e.g. there 
is genetic overlap between schizophrenia and bipolar disorder-, no prognostic 
specificity nor treatment specificity that can distinguish one diagnosis from another. 
As a consequence, it seems that the most basic requirement coming from the disease 
model, namely that there exist identifiable and distinct diseases to begin with, is not 
met.  
Furthermore, it has consistently been demonstrated that psychiatric symptoms are 
dimensional rather than categorical in nature. Symptoms of depression, anxiety, 
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bipolar disorder, autism and psychosis are all present at a sub-clinical level in the 
general population, and form a continuum with normal variation and clinical 
symptoms at the extreme ends (van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & 
Krabbendam 2009). Disregarding this continuous nature of symptoms and conceiving 
of psychopathological phenomena as distant from everyday mentality might have 
been another motivation for the search for narrow factors (neural, genetic or 
otherwise) outside of experience as the way of making sense of psychopathology. 
One can also raise issues about the very idea of underlying causes. In order to be 
genuinely underlying, the phenomena which act as causes should be able to exist 
independently from the symptoms – just like a virus can exist independently of its 
pathological effects in a body (a similar point is made in Fuchs 2012). In the previous 
section, we saw that sensorimotor theorists defend that the way brain states or 
properties are characterized in perceptual terms —i.e. as visual, auditory, tactile— 
depends upon what kinds of perceptual person-environment interactions these brain 
states and properties are, or have been involved in. In other words, the criterion for 
deciding whether or not a brain area should be characterized in perceptual terms, is 
stated in terms of interactions (or wide, as we have said), and not in terms of non-
interactively (or narrow) characterized brain properties. Exactly the same applies in 
the domain of psychopathology. For whether a narrowly specified property or feature 
is a valid candidate “underlying cause”, depends on wide —symptom-related— 
criteria. Whether some brain property can form (part of) the underlying cause for a 
certain form of psychopathology is determined by investigating how the property or 
feature correlates with symptoms. If the property or feature does not correlate with 
symptoms in some required way (however that is defined), it is discarded as a 
candidate underlying cause. Importantly, the reverse does not happen: symptoms are 
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not discarded as genuine symptoms when a correlation between symptoms and a 
narrow property turns out not to meet some requirement.  That is, if a candidate for 
underlying property (narrowly described) is not correlated in the required way with 
symptoms, one retracts the assumption that the narrow property forms the underlying 
cause, rather than retracting the idea that the symptoms are genuinely symptomatic. 
 
 
3.2 The interactive approach in action 
The foregoing provides reasons to study psychopathology by studying symptoms, in 
an interactive framework. In an interactive, wide approach, symptoms constitute 
specific ways a subject interacts with his or her environment. Interaction in 
psychopathology is different from non-psychopathological ways of interaction, but it 
is at the same time deeply related. 
It is by having a closer look at symptoms that one can discern how going wide, in 
contrast to taking a narrow stance, is both theoretically mandatory and practically 
beneficial. Let us start at the theoretical end first and ask what sort of results and what 
kind of understanding a wide approach in the study of psychopathology leads to. 
Psychopathological symptoms are natural experiences emerging in the realm of 
normal daily life. ‘Taking a wide approach’ thus involves the study of how these 
psychopathological symptoms arise and change in a person’s interaction with her 
context. In order to grasp these interactions, one needs instruments to track them and 
chart their dynamics. Momentary assessment approaches using structured diary 
techniques, such as the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) (Myin-Germeys et al. 
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2009) or Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) (Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford 
2008), allow to systematically study experiences, including psychopathological 
symptoms, in the realm of daily life. They make possible real-time monitoring of 
variation in experiences as well as the context in which they occur. Subjects fill out 
questionnaires regarding their current thoughts, feelings, psychopathological 
symptoms, as well as regarding the context (where the person is, what the person is 
doing, the company the person is with) and appraisals of this context. Participants fill 
out the questionnaire at semi random-time points, typically between 4 and 10 times a 
day, and this for a number of consecutive days. Earlier studies used paper-and-pencil 
approaches combined with a preprogrammed watch to provide the signal; currently 
Personal Digital Assistants and apps are available (Kimhy, Myin-Germeys, Palmier-
Claus, & Swendsen 2012). This provides a number of consecutive data-points for 
each subject, allowing to study within-moment interactions as well as interactions 
over moments in time. 
Is it possible to identify specific patterns of interactions associated with psychiatric 
symptoms following this approach? Let’s focus on one example here, that of 
psychotic disorder. Psychotic disorders are characterized by positive symptoms such 
as hallucinations (mainly hearing voices) and delusional ideas (such as paranoia or 
ideas of reference), and negative symptoms such as lack of motivation, anhedonia, 
and lack of social interaction. Several studies using Experience Sampling 
Methodology have been conducted in subjects with psychotic symptoms 
e.g.(Oorschot, Kwapil, Delespaul, & Myin-Germeys 2009 for overview).  
A first finding coming out of these studies is that symptoms such as paranoid ideation 
or hallucinations show huge variation over time (Oorschot et al. 2012; Thewissen, 
Bentall, Lecomte, van Os, & Myin-Germeys 2008), meaning that the intensity of 
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these symptoms fluctuates highly from one moment to the next. The relevant question 
would then be whether we can identify interactional changes associated with these 
fluctuations over time. Both affective/subjective and situational factors have been 
associated with increases in psychotic symptoms. For example, an increase in anxiety 
and a decrease in self-esteem have been shown to precede an increase of paranoia 
(Oorschot et al. 2012; Thewissen et al. 2008; Thewissen et al. 2011). The experience 
of subjective stress has also been associated with increased levels of psychotic 
symptoms (Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & van Os 2005; Myin-Germeys & van Os 
2007). Both of these findings are found across the whole psychosis continuity, in 
clinical patients but also in persons with lower-level psychotic experiences (Lataster, 
Myin-Germeys, Derom, Thiery, & van Os 2009). Situational factors have been 
associated with psychosis as well. Sleep disturbances are associated with increased 
levels of paranoia (Freeman, Pugh, Vorontsova, & Southgate 2009) whereas cannabis 
use results in more intense hallucinations (Henquet et al. 2010). The social context 
has also been found to be of relevance. More paranoia has been reported when people 
are accompanied by strangers compared with times when they are with friends or 
family (Collip et al. 2011). However, at the upper end of the continuum —where the 
threshold of the symptomatic lies— this interaction changes. Patients with clinical 
levels of paranoia report high levels of paranoia irrespective of the company they are 
in.  
Apart from allowing to track how psychotic symptoms vary in response to the context, 
ESM studies have established that people with psychotic experiences are in general 
more responsive to the environment. When persons with psychosis encounter stress – 
even minor daily hassles – they not only become more psychotic, they also show 
increased negative affect, thus overreacting to this negative environment (Myin-
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Germeys & van Os 2007; Myin-Germeys, van Os, Schwartz, Stone, & Delespaul 
2001). Interestingly, they also are more reactive to a positive environment. When they 
encounter positive events, they will gain more in the sense that their positive affect 
will increase more compared to control subjects (Oorschot et al. 2013). Similarly, 
they experience more positive affect from being in social company (Oorschot et al. 
2013). Overall, there seems to be a higher responsivity to the environment compared 
to persons without these disorders. This has lead to the proposition of renaming 
schizophrenia as “salience dysregulation syndrome” (van Os 2009), which would 
reflect a more accurate description of the changes in person-environment interaction 
defining its psychotic symptoms.  
Let’s take a closer look at negative symptoms. Negative symptoms are among the 
most disabling psychopathological symptoms, they are poorly understood and hard to 
treat. What understanding of these negative symptoms does a wide approach provide? 
An interesting example is anhedonia, defined as reduced hedonic capacity, or the loss 
of the ability to enjoy things that were previously enjoyable, and considered a core 
feature of schizophrenia. Although patients with schizophrenia score higher on 
anhedonia, both with self-assessment scales (Blanchard, Mueser, & Bellack 1998; 
Cohen et al. 2005) and when questioned by trained interviewers (Earnst & Kring 
1997), experimental studies with emotion inducing stimuli found no difference in 
positive affect between patients and healthy controls (Cohen & Minor 2010). 
Experience Sampling Studies in real life, on the other hand, have found overall lower 
levels of positive affect in patients compared to controls (Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, 
& deVries 2000; Oorschot et al. 2013). What could explain these paradoxical 
findings? One explanation is related to the difference between anticipatory pleasure 
(related to future activities) and consummatory (in the moment) pleasure (Gard, Kring, 
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Gard, Horan, & Green 2007). One ESM study found that patients indeed had more 
difficulty with anticipatory pleasure, while their consummatory pleasure was intact 
(Gard et al. 2007).  Second, it was investigated whether reduced positive affect in 
patients as measured in the ESM studies reflected diminished hedonic capacity or 
merely resulted from less pleasurable life circumstances (Oorschot et al. 2013). 
Indeed, patients reported less pleasant events, but when a pleasant event happened, 
they reported equal or even more positive affect compared to healthy controls. So 
combining both findings, patients are capable of experiencing pleasure in the moment. 
However, they may be less likely to seek out opportunities to engage in activities 
when their ability to anticipate which potential experiences will be rewarding is 
impaired (Oorschot et al. 2013).  
 
The picture that emerges from the foregoing wide approach to psychopathology is 
that of psychopathology as a specific pattern of interaction, related to, but differing 
from non-pathological patterns of interaction. Crucially, the relevant patterns of 
interaction are thoroughly context-sensitive. The example of anhedonia just described 
illustrates this: anhedonia does not form a stable context-invariant building block of 
psychopathology, but it needs itself to be specified in terms of context-sensitive ways 
of affecting and being affected by a particular environment. This repeats, for 
symptoms, what we argued is the case for brain properties: how precisely they relate 
to psychopathology has to be established by inquiring which contextualized 
interactions they are involved in.  
 
3.3 Practical implications of going wide: interactive therapy 
The most important reason to improve understanding of psychopathology is the high 
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burden associated with psychiatric illness and the need for better treatment to relieve 
this burden. A recent study in Europe estimated that well over one third of the 
population in any given twelve month period suffers from a mental disorder, most of 
which are not treated (Wittchen et al. 2011). Furthermore, treatment prospects are 
minimal to modest. Despite enormous developments in pharmacological interventions, 
which are still the primary therapeutic approach for most psychiatric disorders, the 
morbidity and mortality rate associated with psychiatric disorders has not changed (T. 
R. Insel 2012).  
 
The most widely used psychosocial intervention is cognitive-behavioral therapy 
(CBT). Cognitive behavioral therapy is aimed at changing the thinking which is 
assumed to underly action and behavior. However, the results of CBT are mixed, with 
effects often in the “small” range (Cuijpers et al. 2014; Szentagotai & David 2010; 
Turner, van der Gaag, Karyotaki, & Cuijpers 2014). Furthermore, it remains unclear 
what the active component is in the therapy, and “how much of it is due to what was 
added to traditional behavior therapy” (Hayes, Villatte, Levin, & Hildebrandt 2011). 
CBT runs the risk of falling prey to an intellectualist and cognitivist view of mentality. 
According to this view, thoughts understood as attitudes to mental representations, 
play a key role in most aspects of human mentality. Emotions for example are 
understood as having self-related beliefs, taken to be propositional attitudes or 
attitudes-towards-a-propositional-content as core components. Therapy is then aimed 
at changing the mental representations or thoughts that are taken to drive 
dysfunctional mental life. Varga (2014) has argued in great detail how what he calls a 
“CT” (for Cognitive Therapy) view of mentality is problematic. He points out that 
many cases of thinking and emotion do not seem to be driven by explicit thoughts or 
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representations at all. He gives the example of moods, which have been analysed as 
embodied attitudes directly towards the world, rather than toward a representation of 
it (Ratcliffe 2008). “Feeling low”, for example, “is both characterized by the way in 
which the world appears, namely as lacking attractive ‘affordances,’ and the way the 
body feels: slow and heavy.” (Varga 2014, 182). This take on moods in particular and 
on thinking and mental phenomena in general obviously fits within the wide approach 
advocated here, as the focus fully comes to lie on contextualized patterns of affecting 
and being affected by one’s environment. Many of such patterns might not be 
mediated by thoughts —irrespective of whether they are taken to be “explicit” or 
“implicit”— or indeed by any representational contents (Hutto & Myin 2013). If such 
is true, any therapy that always aims for such explicit thoughts or contentful episodes 
as the place where to intervene will be inadequate.  
Two caveats need to be made here. Of course, action and behavior (of humans and 
animals) is complex and rich, for example by being infused with ‘expectations’ or  
‘suspicions’. What should be resisted is the temptation to model these expectations as 
explicit or content carrying thoughts. There is no logical need for this, as an 
expectation can exist as a sensitivity or adaptation to a particular context. An animal 
can be on alert when nearing a particular place because, based on its own history, it 
expects the presence of another animal at that place. But nothing logically requires 
that such sensitivity should only be explicable by a content-carrying inner episode, let 
alone one involving a proposition (Degenaar & Myin, in press). Second, nothing 
stands in the way of admitting that at least some human actions are mediated by 
episodes specifiable only in terms of content (which can only spelled out in terms of 
natural language). A youngster could start to smoke by having inferred that by doing 
so, she would look cool to another youngster. Even in such cases there remains the 
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question to what extent one can change the course of action resulting from the thought 
by intervening in the realm of thoughts. If our protagonist, at an older age, later comes 
to think she should not smoke, this change alone might have little behavioral effect.  
Of course, on the other hand, it should by no means be precluded that one can 
provoke important changes in a wide range of mental attitudes and the interactions 
related to them by changing content-involving attitudes, as the effects of propaganda 
testifies. Most importantly, however, whatever the extent and role of explicit thought 
in human action and behavior, it can’t be assumed that contentful thought mediated 
action must be the model for all intelligent interactions, regardless whether they 
involve humans or animals.  
 
The so-called third generation of contextualized cognitive-behavioral approaches may 
come closer to directly targeting the relevant patterns of interactions. Contextualized 
cognitive-behavioral approaches are set to be “particularly sensitive to the context and 
functions of psychological phenomena, not just their form, and thus tend to emphasize 
contextual and experiential change strategies” (Hayes et al. 2011). Hayes, the 
founding father of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), distilled three 
common components in these contextualized therapies (Hayes et al. 2011). A first 
component relates to issues of acceptance, detachment, and emotion regulation. 
Rather than focusing on the content of thoughts or feelings, these therapies are aimed 
at the relation of the subject to his or her thoughts or feelings. Although this has been 
framed as a content-versus-context distinction, these therapies thus still seem to 
emphasize thoughts and feelings as central.  
A second component Hayes identified is flexible attention or attention to the now. 
Most of these third-generation therapies include elements of mindfulness or 
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awareness toward the present moment, which may “increase one’s sensitivity to 
important features of the environment and one’s own reactions” (Hayes et al. 2011). 
We would claim that it is actually the changes in the person-environment interaction 
that form the crucial component of these therapies, whereas researchers so far have 
claimed their success lies in targeting and reducing maladaptive depressogenic 
cognitive processes such as rumination or thought suppression. Of course, this is not 
to deny that interactions might change as a result of changes in these cognitive 
processes, but only to emphasize one should not assume that interactive changes can 
only occur as a consequence of cognitive changes.  
A final component in contextualized therapies includes meaningful action such as 
motivation to change and behavior activation (Hayes et al. 2011). This component 
may come closest to explicitly targeting person-environment interaction. For example, 
behavioral activation therapy uses activity scheduling and mood monitoring to alter 
the “environing contingencies influencing the client’s depressed mood and behavior” 
(Hayes et al. 2011). Using Experience Sampling Methodology, this approach could be 
taken one step further to directly target the way the person is interacting with her 
environment, as it occurs in real life. One study aimed to improve momentary positive 
affect by providing ESM-derived feedback on the association between positive affect 
and the context (Kramer et al. 2014). The therapy consisted of 6 consecutive weeks of 
ESM using a palmtop (three days / week) and additional weekly standardized 
feedback on personalized patterns of positive affect. In this feedback, participants 
received information on their level of positive affect over the 3-day period, on the 
amount of time spent in certain contexts and most importantly on the association 
between the two. For example, someone would get feedback that the highest level of 
positive affect was reached while being involved in active relaxation. However, the 
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actual amount of time spent in active relaxation may be very limited. Similarly, 
someone may experience higher levels of positive affect when in the company of 
friends, whereas this person may spend most of his time on their own. The 
standardized feedback did not include any directive on what the person should change, 
it only provided information regarding the contextualized patterns of positive affect. 
This randomized clinical trial in 102 depressed patients receiving anti-psychotic 
medication showed that the supplementary ESM derived feedback resulted in a 
significant and clinically relevant stronger decrease in depressive symptoms measured 
by a clinician (-5.5 point on the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale) as well as by self-
report (Inventory of Depressive Symptoms) compared to the control condition of 
treatment as usual. This improvement was found up to 6 months after the end of the 
therapy (Kramer et al. 2014). The positive findings were not only due to the continual 
self-monitoring, since a semi-experimental group doing experience sampling without 
the weekly feedback did not show a similar improvement. This study is just one 
example. However, it shows that interventions directly focusing on person-
environment interactions are feasible and indeed provide an added clinical value.  
 
4. Conclusion 
We have suggested that just as a sensorimotor perspective on perception and 
awareness successfully goes “wide”, that is, incorporates person-environment 
interactions as fundamental to perceptual consciousness, so also should a successful 
approach to psychopathology. Indeed, we showed that an interactive approach 
fundamentally adds to our understanding of psychopathology. Furthermore, 
developments in current psychological therapies are now manifesting a shift towards 
impacting on person-environment interactions. Therapy components such as 
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mindfulness, behavioral activation and even acceptance and detachment may all 
impact on the specific person-environment interactions which constitute the 
symptoms. Still, this is mainly an implicit consequence rather than an active target of 
the intervention. We claim that explicitly targeting person-environment interactions, 
as has been done in the ESM behavioral activation study, presents a way forward to 
improve psychological interventions. Following a wide approach might thus not only 
prove theoretically fruitful, but might also have considerable applicable clinical 
benefits.  
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